Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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II.B. REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Article VII

9. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the continued successful operation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) which is the cornerstone of a non-discriminatory régime prohibiting the testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition or the receipt, storage, installation or deployment of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. It urges the Latin American States that are eligible to become parties to the Treaty to do so at an early date, an important step to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty in the region, and it reaffirms the repeated exhortations of the United Nations General Assembly to France, which is already a signatory of Additional Protocol 1, to ratify that Protocol. The Conference welcomes the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol 2 to this Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States.

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12. The Conference considers that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa at any time frustrates the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and that collaboration with South Africa in this area would undermine the credibility and the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. South Africa is called upon to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to IAEA safeguards and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States Parties directly concerned are urged to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

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16. The Conference considers that the unsafeguarded nuclear capability of Israel complicates the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as well as the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. The Conference calls upon Israel to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to IAEA safeguards and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference also calls on the other non-NPT parties in the region to accede to the Treaty as soon as practicable. The application of IAEA safeguards to their respective nuclear activities would, as a confidence-building measure, contribute to reducing tension and promoting peace and security through ensuring the total absence of nuclear weapons in the region and will greatly facilitate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in it.